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Abstract
We analyze a model in which information may be voluntarily disclosed by a rm and/or by a third
party, e.g., nancial analysts. Due to its strategic nature, corporate voluntary disclosure is qualita-
tively dierent from third-party disclosure. Greater analyst coverage crowds out (crowds in) corporate
voluntary disclosure when analysts mostly discover information that is available (unavailable) to the
rm. Nevertheless, greater analyst coverage always improves the overall quality of public information.
We base this claim on two market quality measures: price eciency, which is statistical in nature, and
liquidity, which is derived in a trading stage that follows the disclosure stage.
Keywords: information disclosure, voluntary disclosure, price eciency, liquidity, analysts
JEL: G14, D82, D83
1. Introduction
There is a growing literature on voluntary disclosure that studies how agents strategically decide
whether to disclose or withhold their private information. Public companies, for example, are mandated
to disclose certain information in their periodic reporting, but other information may be disclosed at
the discretion of managers. For example, a rm does not have to disclose that a major customer is
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negotiating a deal with one of its competitors. Hence, corporate voluntary disclosure is often a major
source of information in capital markets.1 Another example is an entrepreneur who seeks funding
from investors (VC funds, angels, etc.); the entrepreneur can choose whether to disclose or conceal the
results of previous attempts to raise funding or to acquire new customers. Examples are not limited
to nancial markets. An incumbent politician may obtain private information about the success or
failure of policies she has supported, and can choose whether to disclose or conceal these results. In all
of these examples, informed agents are reluctant to lie because of severe or even criminal punishment,
or because once the information is voluntarily disclosed it can be easily veried. Instead, they can
choose to withhold negative information, taking advantage of public uncertainty about whether they
indeed have private information.
The current literature focuses on settings in which a single agent chooses whether to disclose or
withhold private information and there is no other source that can potentially discover this information.
In practice, various sources that may discover and reveal a rm's private information are very prevalent.
For example, nancial analysts and rating agencies provide additional information about public rms,
investors can gather information through their social network about an entrepreneur, and the media
and independent think tanks can assess public policies.
In this paper, we introduce such additional sources of information into a standard voluntary disclo-
sure setting with uncertainty about information endowment. Our main question is how the possibility
of information disclosure by a third party aects the aggregate amount of publicly available infor-
mation. To answer this question, we rst need to study the reaction of the disclosing agent to the
possibility of a report by the third party and then to analyze the overall information that is revealed
by both sources.
Our model departs from a standard voluntary disclosure setting with uncertain information endow-
ment (à la Dye, 1985, and Jung and Kwon, 1988). A manager of a public rm who wishes to maximize
her rm's stock price may be endowed with private value-relevant information. The nancial market
prices the rm based on all publicly available information. If the manager is informed, she can credi-
bly and costlessly disclose her information to the market. The novelty of our model is the additional
external source of information, e.g., an analyst who may discover and publish information that the
manager may privately hold. We assume that the analyst may discover and publish information when
1Beyer et al. (2010) nd that approximately 66% of accounting-based return variance is generated by voluntary
disclosures, 22% by analyst forecasts, 8% by earnings announcements, and 4% by SEC lings.
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the manager is informed as well as when the manager is uninformed, and we allow for correlation in
the manager's and analyst's information endowment.
We rst show that, as is standard in this literature, the game has a unique equilibrium, in which
the manager discloses the realization of her private information if and only if it is higher than an
equilibrium threshold. We then study how the rm's disclosure strategy changes in response to an
increase in analyst coverage, i.e., an increase in the probability that the analyst discovers and discloses
information. We show that the directional eect depends on the information production of the analyst.
If an increase in coverage aects more the probability of analysts to discover information that the
manager is unaware of, e.g., information on market conditions, compared to information that she
knows, then such an increase crowds in corporate voluntary disclosure. That is, rms respond to an
increase in analyst coverage by decreasing the disclosure threshold, which increases the amount of
disclosed information. If, however, an increase in coverage aects more the probability of analysts to
discover information that the manager knows, compared to information that she is unaware of, then
such an increase crowds out corporate voluntary disclosure, that is, rms disclose less in response to an
increase in analyst coverage. This last result, which is new to the theoretical literature, is consistent
with the empirical evidence in Anantharaman and Zhang (2011), Balakrishnan et al. (2014), and Ellul
and Panayides (2018) (see more details on the empirical literature below).
Given the empirical support for the crowding-out result, it is interesting to study the eect of an
increase in analyst coverage on the overall amount of public information  including the information
disclosed both by the analyst and by the manager. This is a challenging question, due to the qualitative
dierence between voluntary disclosure and information provided by analysts. While informed man-
agers tend to disclose positive information and hide negative information, exogenous sources (such as
analysts, the media, etc.) provide information that may be positive or negative. Thus, more exogenous
information aects not only the amount of information that becomes available but also the type of
information, and specically the balance between positive and negative information. Formally, infor-
mation in environments with varying levels of analyst coverage cannot be ranked using the Blackwell
informativeness criterion.
We use two separate measures to capture the overall information available to the market. First,
we consider a quadratic loss function, which equals the expected squared dierence between the rm's
actual and perceived value. This measure has a natural interpretation in terms of price eciency or
ex-post return volatility. It can also represent the utility function of an information receiver such as
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an investor, and is consistent with the assumption that such a receiver sets prices to be equal to the
expected value, conditional on all available information.
Our second measure of information quality is more specic to the capital market example and can
be directly linked to empirical ndings. We use the expected bid-ask spread as a measure that reects
the extent of information asymmetry in the market. We augment the disclosure model by introducing
a trading stage à la Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that follows the disclosure stage. The trade and
pricing in this stage are aected by the information that was revealed by the manager and the analyst.
Our main result is that both price eciency and liquidity increase as a result of an increase in analyst
coverage; that is, the overall eect of an increase in third-party disclosure on market quality is always
positive.
The economic argument for our result relies on the qualitative dierence between the two informa-
tion sources: the analyst and the rm. While an increase in the probability that the analyst reports
aects pricing of all types of rms (good and bad), changes in voluntary disclosure aect only those
types that are close to the disclosure threshold, that is, those that their pricing after they cease to be
disclosed is close to the pricing they obtain following disclosure. Thus, the quality of public information
is more sensitive to the former than to the latter.
Another way to put the intuition is that an increase in analyst coverage changes the balance
between the negative and the positive information that is being disclosed: more negative information
is now being disclosed, while the positive information is less aected (since it is disclosed by the
rm as well as the analyst). Thus, the overall quality of information improves. The change in the
balance between negative and positive information, due to an increase in third-party disclosure, should
be reected in the skewness of returns. While rms with little coverage will exhibit strong positive
skewness of the disclosed information, an increase in analyst coverage should make the distribution of
public information more symmetric. Support for this can be found in Acharya et al. (2011), who nd
that larger rms exhibit a more symmetric return distribution. This seems to be consistent with our
ndings, since smaller rms receive less attention from exogenous information sources such as nancial
analysts and the media.
To complete our analysis, we analyze an additional channel through which analyst coverage can
aect voluntary disclosure. It seems natural to believe that, if the analyst issues a report and the
rm does not disclose, the manager may be accused of hiding unfavorable information and incur a
reputation or litigation costs. We extend the basic model by introducing such a cost, which increases
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in the belief of investors that the manager is actively withholding information. We show that this cost
does result in more disclosure, though it cannot generate full disclosure. Thus, analyst coverage may
also have a disciplinary role by incentivizing the manager to precautionarily disclose information. We
further show that the eect of analyst coverage on precautionary disclosure is ambiguous, and depends
on the analyst's information production: if the analyst is relatively more likely to uncover information
that is already available to the manager, then an analyst report is a stronger signal that the manager
is withholding unfavorable information, and an increase in analyst coverage increases precautionary
disclosure.
Finally, we discuss the case where an informed analyst's signal is less precise than the signal of an
informed manager. This assumption is realistic for various types of private information, e.g., a rm's
internal information. We show that our results continue to hold given some additional assumptions on
the information production technology of the analyst.
Our results can be used to assess certain policies that aim to increase market transparency in
settings with voluntary disclosure. Such policies often focus on improving the information provided
by one market participant without considering its eect on other market participants and the overall
information available to the market.2 Financial analysts have an important role in revealing rms'
private information to the capital market, but there are other sources of exogenous revelation, such
as news media, social media, competitors, suppliers, and the government. Our results show that an
improvement in one information source may crowd out information from another source, and that
dierent parties aect the overall amount of public information dierently. Our model suggests that to
the extent that increasing the likelihood of such information discovery is not too costly, it is benecial
in terms of price eciency and liquidity.
Unlike the theoretical literature (which is reviewed in the next subsection), the empirical literature
studies the eect of analyst coverage on rms' voluntary disclosure and on the liquidity of rms' stock.
Empirical evidence supports the predictions of our model. For example, Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012)
show that following an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, due to mergers and closings in the
brokerage industry, information about aected rms became more asymmetric, and the liquidity of
2Examples of regulations that focus on information provision include: the SarbanseOxley Act,which attempts to
increase the mandated reporting of rms; the Williams Act of 1968, which limits the ability of investors to trade
anonymously on their private (optimistic) information; the regulation on analyst certication (Reg AC),which requires
analysts to disclose possible conicts of interest and prevent biased reports; the DoddFrank Act, which includes several
measures aimed at improving the transparency and viability of credit ratings. See also the discussion in Goldstein and
Yang (2017).
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these rms' stocks decreased. Ellul and Panayides (2018) use a statistical model to identify exogenous
terminations of analyst coverage. They show that stocks of rms that have lost complete analyst
coverage experience a decrease in both liquidity and price eciency.3
Anantharaman and Zhang (2011) and Balakrishnan et al. (2014) use the same exogenous negative
shock to analyst coverage that is used in Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) to establish the eect of a
decrease in analyst coverage on rms' voluntary disclosure. Balakrishnan et al. (2014) show that
one quarter following the decrease in analyst coverage, the aected rms increased their voluntary
disclosure (earning guidance) to mitigate the increase in information asymmetry and the decrease in
liquidity. This increased disclosure partially reverses the decrease in liquidity, although the overall
eect remains negative, consistent with both predictions of our model. Ellul and Panayides (2018)
divide their sample of rms that experienced unexpected coverage termination into those that increased
the number of news releases in the post-termination period and those that kept the number unchanged
or decreased it. They show that liquidity deteriorates less in the former group, suggesting again that
rms disseminate more information to the market to mitigate the eect of the decrease in analyst
coverage.
Following a review of the related theoretical literature, we describe in Section 2 the setting of our
model. Our objective is to address three questions pertaining to the voluntary disclosure setting with
the possibility of an exogenous signal. First, how does the introduction of an exogenous signal aect the
equilibrium disclosure strategy of the manager? This analysis is presented in Section 3. Second, since
the presence of an exogenous signal aects the manager's disclosure strategy, how does a change in the
probability of an exogenous signal, e.g., through a change in analyst coverage, aect price eciency?
We answer this in Section 4. Finally, how does a change in analyst coverage aect the liquidity of the
rm's stock? To answer that, in Section 5 we introduce, and analyze, an extended model that includes
a stylized trading stage à la Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Section 6 presents two possible extensions
of the model: Section 6.1 discusses a model where the manager suers a cost if she does not disclose
and the analyst publishes a report, and Section 6.2 discusses a framework where the analyst observes
information that is noisier than the information of the manager. Section 7 briey concludes.
3Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) use several measures of liquidity, including the bid-ask spread, which is the measure
we use in Section 5. Ellul and Panayides (2018) use a measure of price eciency that follows Hasbrouck (1993), and is
close in nature to our theoretical measure in Section 4. Their measure of liquidity is also the bid-ask spread.
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1.1. Related Theoretical Literature
Our study of voluntary disclosure in the presence of potentially informed traders contributes to two
streams of the theoretical literature. The rst is the voluntary disclosure literature. To the best of our
knowledge, only a few theoretical papers study voluntary disclosure in the presence of a potentially
informed market/receiver. In an early contribution, Dutta and Trueman (2002) study a setting in
which a rm's manager can credibly disclose private information, but do not know whether the market
will react positively or negatively to this information. Langberg and Sivaramakrishnan (2008, 2010)
oer two models of voluntary disclosure with an additional analyst, where the analyst's information
is orthogonal to the information of the rm; in our model, analysts and the rm potentially learn the
same information. This makes the analysis very dierent. Einhorn (2018) also explores the eect of
additional information sources on voluntary disclosure. In her model, in contrast to the present paper,
there is a dierence between the information that the manager learns and the information that she
can disclose, and this dierence determines the manager's disclosure strategy. The closest work with
an informed receiver is Ispano (2016), whose model, while very dierent, can be seen as a simplied
version of our model with three possible rm values and a specic analyst technology. In this simple
version, he proves that the utility of the receiver  which is equivalent to price eciency in our setting
 is increasing with the probability that the receiver is informed. He does not discuss liquidity. Ebert
et al. (2019) analyze, in a similar framework to ours, dierent types of information leaks. See also
Quigley and Walther (2018) and Banerjee and Kim (2017) for related, yet dierent, models of voluntary
disclosure where the market may observe additional information.
The second stream of literature studies how changes in one source of information aect the in-
centives of other parties to acquire and disseminate information. Several papers have considered the
endogenous acquisition of private information by investors in a setting where public information is
available (see, e.g., Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985; Demski and Feltham, 1994; Kim and Verrecchia,
1994; McNichols and Trueman, 1994). A key result in this literature is that better public information
crowds out incentives to acquire private information.4 Goldstein and Yang (2017) study, in a noisy-
REE setting (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), the eect of such crowding out on the overall amount
of public information. They show that when the crowding out of private information acquisition is
taken into account, the overall eect of increased public information is ambiguous and depends on the
4Another related paper is by Gao and Liang (2013), who study how a rm's commitment to disclosure aects investors'
incentives to acquire information. Their focus is on the feedback eect, whereby the rm's manager learns from prices.
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parameter values and the particular measure of market quality. Fischer and Stocken (2010) study a
model in which analysts acquire costly information and then communicate with investors using cheap-
talk messages (as in Crawford and Sobel, 1982). They also nd that better exogenous information
may crowd out the incentives of analysts to acquire information, and decrease the overall amount of
publicly available information .
Our paper complements this literature by analyzing exogenous information and an endogenous,
voluntary disclosure decision. In our model, better exogenous information, e.g., due to greater analyst
coverage, may crowd out or crowd in voluntary disclosure. Our voluntary disclosure setup is unique,
because, although the analyst and the rm observe the same type of information, the information
that they reveal publicly is dierent. The rm discloses only high signals and withholds low signals.
The analyst, however, reveals all the information he obtains. In contrast to the papers described
above, in our setup the two sources of information are not perfect substitutes, that is, an increase
in analyst coverage cannot be fully oset by lower corporate voluntary disclosure. The dierence
between voluntary disclosure and other means of communication leads to dierent qualitative results:
in contrast to Fischer and Stocken (2010) and Goldstein and Yang (2017), even when exogenous
information crowds out voluntary disclosure, better exogenous information always has a positive eect
on the overall amount of public information. We explain our result in detail in Section 4.
2. Setting
Our model builds on the voluntary disclosure literature initiated by Grossman (1981), Milgrom
(1981), and Dye (1985). We consider a rm that is involved in a project, e.g., drug development or oil
exploration, which will either succeed or fail. We denote the terminal value of the rm by x ∈ {0, 1}
where x = 1 following success and x = 0 following failure. The ex-ante probability of success is
µ0 ≡ Pr (x = 1) and the probability of failure is 1− µ0 ≡ Pr (x = 0).
Information Structure. With probability q ∈ (0, 1), the manager of the rm observes additional infor-
mation about the possible outcome of the project, in the form of a signal s. With probability 1− q the
manager does not observe a signal. Information endowment is independent of the realization of s, and
therefore the ex-ante expected value of s (or x) conditional on an information event also equals µ0.
The signal may represent, for example, the results of a clinical trial or an oil exploration, information
about competing projects/rms or information about relevant macroeconomic conditions. We assume
that all players in the game are risk neutral, and thus it is without loss of generality to assume that
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the signal s is simply the updated probability of success, that is, Pr (x̃ = 1|s) = E(x̃|s) = s. Hence,
we assume that s̃ ∈ [0, 1], with a PDF f (s), a continuous CDF F (s), and E [s̃] = µ0.
Remark 1 (Alternative State Space). Most of our results extend to arbitrary continuous distributions
of x̃ and s̃ (with bounded or unboanded support). This include all the results in Sections 3 and 4. The
binary structure is only used to simplify the trading stage in Section 5.
Disclosure and Pricing. If the manager observes the private signal s, she can voluntarily disclose it
to the market. Disclosure is assumed to be costless and credible (veriable at no cost). As standard
in the voluntary disclosure literature, if the manager does not obtain the private signal, she cannot
credibly convey that she is not informed. The manager seeks to maximize the market value, or price,
of the rm.5 For now, assume that risk neutral investors set the market price, P , equal to the expected
value conditional on all the available public information, I. That is, P = E [s̃ | I] = E [x̃ | I]. Later,
in Section 5, we introduce a trading stage that follows Glosten and Milgrom (1985), where prices are
set by a centralized market maker.
The setting introduced so far is similar to a standard voluntary disclosure setting with uncertainty
about information endowment, which has been studied extensively. The main innovation of our setting
is the possibility that the signal s will be made public by an external third party.
Analyst (Exogenous Signal). We use nancial analysts as our main motivating example, however,
any mechanism that induces stochastic public supply of the rm's information, such as news media,
competitors, suppliers, social media, regulators etc., will have a similar eect in our model.
To study the interaction between a rm's voluntary disclosure and the potentially informed market,
we add to the above setting a nancial analyst, who may also learn the realization of the updated
probability of success, s. We abstract from strategic considerations of the analyst, and assume that
whenever analysts discover information they publish it truthfully.6 In the baseline model we assume
that, if informed, both the analyst and the manager observe the same information. In Section 6.2 we
discuss the case where the analyst's information is less precise than that of the manager.
5As standard in the literature, we take the performance-based compensation of the manager as given. Such compen-
sation may be an optimal contract when the manager has additional activities, which are left unmodeled, that demand
eort (as in Holmström, 1979, 1999). Such compensation is also optimal when the market / receiver wishes to price the
rm correctly (Hart et al., 2017).
6It is immediately obvious that all of our results are robust to an analyst's reporting strategy that is potentially
biased, as long as the analyst always issues a report when obtaining information and the analyst's forecast follows a
separating strategy. For an example and additional references see Beyer and Guttman (2011).
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The likelihood of the analyst to discover information may depend on whether the manager is
informed or not. For example, if the information s is the result of a clinical drug trial, it is unlikely
that the analyst will discover this information before the manager does. However, if the signal s is
information about market conditions, the analyst may discover this information even when the manager
is uninformed. To allow for both types of information, we assume a relatively non-restrictive analyst's
information production technology. In particular, assume that the analyst's information production
technology is reected by a pair of conditional probabilities (gI(r), gU (r)), where gI (r) ∈ [0, 1) and
gU (r) ∈ [0, 1) are the probabilities that the analyst discovers s conditional on the manager being
informed and uninformed, respectively. We introduce the parameter r to capture the overall quality
and/or quantity of analysts that cover the rm. We refer to r as analyst coverage. An increase
in analyst coverage weakly increases the probability that the analyst becomes informed when the
manager is informed and when the manager is uninformed. For simplicity, we assume that gI and gU
are dierentiable, and thus assume g′U (r) ≥ 0 and g′I (r) ≥ 0, with at least one strict inequality. Note
that the ex-ante probability that the analyst issues a report is q · gI(r) + (1− q) · gU (r).
Timeline. To summarize our disclosure game, the timeline is as follows.
1. With probability q the manager privately learns the signal s.
2. If the manager is informed, she decides whether to publicly disclose s or not.
3. Analysts learn the signal s with probabilities gI (r) or gU (r), depending on the outcome of stage
1. An informed analyst immediately discloses s to the market.
4. Following the disclosure or lack of disclosure by both the manager and the analyst, market
participants update their beliefs about the expected value of the rm/project.
5. The price of the rm is determined, and the manager is compensated accordingly. We rst
assume risk neutral pricing, and in Section 5 we specify a market mechanism that generates the
price.
The setting and all the parameters of the model are common knowledge.
Remark 2 (Alternative Timing). The information that the manager and the analyst may learn and
disclose is identical. Thus, the manager's disclosure is relevant only in the case the analyst has not
published a report. This implies that even if the manager knows whether the analyst has published,
or about to publish, a report before making her disclosure decision (that is, even if stage 3 is before
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stage 2), the equilibrium is essentially the same: following a disclosure by the analyst the manager
is indierent whether to disclose or not, and following no analyst report the manager's strategy is
identical to her strategy in the current model.
3. Analysis of the Disclosure Decision
3.1. Equilibrium Disclosure Strategy
Given the realized signal, an informed manager chooses a disclosure strategy that maximizes the
expected rm price. If s is publicly disclosed either by the manager or by the analyst  an event we
denote by D  the price of the rm equals its expected value, i.e.,
PD (s) ≡ E [x̃|s] = s.
Denote by ND the event that neither the manager nor the analyst disclosed s, and by PND the
price following such an event. PND is the market's belief about the rm's expected value following no
disclosure., i.e., PND ≡ E [x̃|ND].
The manager's disclosure decision aects the price only when s is not disclosed by the analyst.
Thus, though an informed manager does not know whether the analyst will be informed or not, she
conditions her decision only on the event that the analyst will not be informed. When the analyst is
not informed, an informed manager's optimal strategy is to disclose s if and only if PD (s) > PND.
While PD(s) is increasing in s, PND is independent of the manager's type. Therefore, any equilibrium
disclosure strategy is characterized by a threshold signal - which we denote by σ - such that an informed
manager discloses her signal if and only if s ≥ σ.
The price following no disclosure by the manager or the analyst, PND, depends on the market's
belief about the manager's disclosure strategy. If the market believes the manager uses a disclosure
threshold σ, then the price following no disclosure is given by
PND(σ) ≡ E [x̃|ND, σ] = (1− q) · (1− gU (r))E [s̃] + qF (σ) · (1− gI(r)) · E [s̃|s < σ]
(1− q) (1− gU (r)) + qF (σ) (1− gI(r))
. (1)
The price is a weighted average of the prior mean and the mean conditional on withholding signals below
σ, with weights representing the conditional probabilities that the manager is informed and uninformed,
given that no analyst report was published. Thus, for any exogenously given disclosure threshold
σ ∈ (0, 1) the price given no disclosure is lower than the prior mean, that is, PND(σ) < E [s̃] = µ0.
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Our disclosure model generalizes Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) to a setting that contains
an additional stochastic public revelation mechanism. Formally, those models are a particular case of
our setting in which gI (r) = gU (r) = 0. It is easy to extend the analysis in Jung and Kwon (1988) to
our setting and show that a threshold equilibrium exists, and that it is unique.
Fact 1. There exists a unique equilibrium to the disclosure game, in which an informed manager
discloses if and only if the signal s is greater than a disclosure threshold σ∗. σ∗ is the signal that
makes the manager indierent between disclosing or withholding. The disclosure threshold is given by
the unique solution of the condition
σ∗ = PND(σ∗). (2)
Similarly, it is easy to show that the derivative ∂P
ND(σ)
∂σ is less than one in the neighborhood of σ
∗,
and thus a change in any parameter that increases or decreases the function PND(σ) for any threshold
σ, also increases or decreases the equilibrium threshold σ∗.7 If, for example, a change in r increases the
price following no disclosure for any exogenously given disclosure threshold, then it must also increase
the equilibrium threshold (that is, decrease disclosure). This is formalized in the following fact.
Fact 2. The equilibrium disclosure threshold σ∗ is increasing (decreasing) in r, if and only if PND(σ)
is increasing (decreasing) in r.
3.2. Eect of Analyst Coverage on Disclosure Strategy
In this section we analyze the main comparative static of the disclosure game  how the level of
analyst coverage, r, aects the manager's equilibrium disclosure threshold, σ∗.
Based on Fact 2, to study the eect of analyst coverage on corporate disclosure, we can study
how analyst coverage aects the price given no disclosure for an exogenous disclosure threshold σ, i.e.,
∂PND(σ)
∂r . Note from (1) that, for any exogenous disclosure threshold σ,
∂PND(σ)
∂gI(r)




Greater gI (r) means that the analyst is more likely to discover and publish s when the manager is
informed. Thus, no disclosure when gI (r) is greater implies that it is less likely that the manager
is informed and withholds negative information. Therefore, an increase in gI (r) increases P
ND. In
contrast, greater gU (r) means that the analyst is more likely to discover and disclose s when the




|σ=σ∗= 0. See Fact 3 in the Appendix.
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the manager is informed and withholds negative information. Therefore, an increase in gU (r) decreases










Since both gI (r) and gU (r) increase in r, the overall eect of changes in r on P
ND is not clear. Without
further assumptions about the functions gI (r) and gU (r), one cannot conclude whether an increase
in analyst coverage increases or decreases the equilibrium disclosure threshold. Next, we provide the
condition that determines the eect of a change in r on the disclosure strategy, and thus on corporate
disclosure.
3.2.1. Informed Analyst Ratio and Eect on Disclosure
In order to study the eect of analyst coverage on the equilibrium disclosure strategy, it is useful
to consider the following function
m(r) ≡ Pr (analyst is uninformed |manager is uninformed)





m(r) ∈ [0,∞) is the ratio between the likelihood that the analyst does not discover and discloses s
when the manager is uninformed and the likelihood that the analyst does not disclose s when the
manager is informed. For convenience, we henceforth refer to m(r) as the informed analyst ratio.
Denote by σ∗D the disclosure threshold in a model with no analyst, i.e., where gU = gI = 0. This
is the classic Dye (1985) model. We rst show that the size of m(r) determines whether the presence
of an analyst increases or decreases voluntary disclosure compared to the Dye (1985) model.
Lemma 1. The rm discloses less information compared to the case where an analyst is not available
if and only if the informed analyst ratio is greater than one; that is
σ∗(r) > σ∗D ⇐⇒ m(r) > 1.
Proof. Using (1), PND(σ, r) can be rewritten as
PND(σ, r) =
(1− q)E [x̃] + q ·m(r)−1 · F (σ)E [x̃ | s < σ]
1− q + q ·m(r)−1 · F (σ)
. (4)
By (4) and the fact that E [s̃] > E [s̃ | s < σ], it is clear that PND(σ, r) is increasing in m(r). By (3),
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m = 1 when gI = gU = 0. Thus, P
ND(σ, r) > PND(σ, r) |gI=gU=0 if and only if m(r) > 1. The lemma
then follows from Fact 2.
We now turn to the eect of changes in analyst coverage on the level of voluntary disclosure, i.e.,
on the disclosure threshold. The following proposition shows that this eect depends on the directional
change in m(r) as r changes.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, analyst coverage crowds out corporate voluntary disclosure if and only
if m′(r) > 0, that is,
∂σ∗
∂r
> 0 ⇐⇒ m′(r) > 0.
Proof. By (4) and the fact that E [s̃] > E [s̃ | s < σ], it is clear that PND(σ, r) is increasing in m(r).
Thus, ∂P
ND(σ)
∂r > 0 i m
′(r) > 0. The lemma then follows from Fact 2.
Greater m(r) means that the analyst is relatively more likely to be uninformed when the manager
is uninformed than when the manager is informed. Thus, if the analyst does not report, this signals
that the manager is more likely to be uninformed. Formally, as shown by (4),
Pr (manager is uninformed | ND) = 1− q
1− q + q ·m(r)−1 · F (σ)
.
Therefore, higher m(r) gives the manager a higher payo in the case that the analyst does not publish
a report, and thus a higher incentive to withhold. Note that, as discussed above, the probability that
the analyst becomes informed does not enter the manager's payo function in any way except through
PND.
3.2.2. Does Analyst Coverage Crowds out or Crowds in Voluntary Disclosure?
Proposition 1 shows that the eect of analyst coverage on voluntary disclosure depends on properties
of the analyst's information production. If an increase in analyst coverage is more likely to uncover
information that the manager is unaware of, then Proposition 1 predicts that voluntary disclosure will
increase with analyst coverage (crowding in). If, however, an increase in analyst coverage is more
likely to uncover information that is known to the manager, then voluntary disclosure is expected to
decrease (crowding out).
Whether the analyst is more likely to possess information when the manager is informed or when
the manager is uninformed depends on the nature of the information. For some types of information,
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such as internal accounting information, clinical trials, and drilling results, it is reasonable to assume
that if the manager does not observe the information it is very unlikely that the analyst will learn it.
For such information, crowding out should prevail. For other types of information, such as information
about market conditions, competitors, and new regulations, it is reasonable that the analyst will learn
the information even if the manager does not. For such information, both crowding in and crowding out
is theoretically plausible. Our model does not restrict the nature of the information and accommodates
both crowding out and crowding in.
The empirical evidence that is reviewed in the Introduction suggests that, on average, analyst
coverage crowds out voluntary disclosure. Anantharaman and Zhang (2011) as well as Balakrishnan
et al. (2014) report that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage led rms to provide more earning
guidance (which is the most commonly used measure of voluntary disclosure). This empirical evidence,
viewed through the lens of our model, suggests that analysts mostly uncover information that is already
available to the manager. In technical terms, it suggests that information structures with m′(r) > 0
are more prevalent.
Our model can also be used to guide future empirical research in order to gain insight on the
information sources of analysts. For example, future research may analyze the eect of analyst coverage
on voluntary disclosure at the industry level (or some other partition of the data). Our model can then
be used to suggest whether analysts who cover a specic industry are more likely to learn information
when the manager is informed or uninformed.
We oer below two relatively simple examples of such information structures, which we nd ap-
pealing and realistic. In both examples m′(r) > 0.
Example 1 (Private Inquiry and Leaks). Suppose that the manager learns s̃ with probability q. The
analyst has two potential sources of information, one within the rm and the other external. Examples
for external sources could be information about the industry or macro economic conditions. Further
assume that the probability that the analyst learns s from an external source is r and this probability
is independent of whether the manager is informed or not. One interesting case of this example is
r = 0, which may represent the results of a clinical trial or oil and gas drilling, that are unlikely to be
available to the analyst and not to the manager.
The inside source of information captures information that is leaked to the analyst from within the
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rm.8 Such information can be observed by the analyst only when the manager is informed. Suppose
that the probability that the analyst learns s from insiders, conditional on the manager being informed,
is δ(r) ∈ (0, 1). Naturally we assume that an increase in analyst coverage increases the probability of
leaks. For simplicity, we assume that δ(r) is dierentiable, and δ′(r) > 0. In this example, we obtain
gU (r) = r and gI(r) = r + (1− r)δ(r), so that m(r) = 11−δ(r) .
Example 2 (Conditionally Independent Information Endowment). Suppose that with probability
ω ∈ (0, 1) some information event occurs and with probability 1 − ω no information event occurs. If
no information event occurs, the rm's expected value remains the prior mean (µ0). However, if an
information event occurs, it generates a new probability of success s, which equals to the updated
expected value of the rm.
Conditional on an information event occurring, the probability that the analyst discover s is r,
and the probability of the manager discovering s is qω (so the overall probability that the manager
discovers s is q). Assume that the information endowment events of the manager and the analyst are











so that m(r) = 1 + 1−ω1−q ·
r
1−r
One can easily verify that m′(r) > 0 in both examples. Thus, by Proposition 1, the manager's
disclosure threshold increases in analyst coverage (∂σ
∗
∂r > 0). In other words, in both of these examples
an increase in analyst coverage crowds out voluntary disclosure.
3.3. Analyst Coverage and Public Information
An increase in analyst coverage, r, by denition increases the probability that the signal will be
discovered and disclosed by analysts, and thus has a direct eect of improving the available public
information. Such an increase, however, also aects the rm's voluntary disclosure.
In the case of a crowding-in eect, the rm also provides more information under increased analyst
coverage, and thus the overall eect on public information is clearly positive. One can formally
prove that the quality of public information, as measured using Blackwell's informativeness criterion,
8Green et al. (2014) show that access to management remains an important source of information for analysts even
following Regulation Fair-Disclosure (Reg FD).
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improves.9 Therefore, it is clear that in the crowding-in case the price eciency and liquidity, as
dened in the following sections, increase in analyst coverage.
However, in the crowding-out case (m′(r) > 0 in Proposition 1), which is supported by the empirical
evidence, the Blackwell informativeness criterion does not hold. This is because greater coverage
increases the probability that the value of some types will be disclosed, but decreases this probability
for other types (types between the previous and the new disclosure thresholds, that cease to be disclosed
by the manager). In the next two sections, we study the eect of analyst coverage on two common
measures of quality of overall public information. The only case that is left to study is the case in
which m′(r) > 0, i.e., analyst coverage crowds out voluntary disclosure.
4. Price Eciency
In this section we asses the overall eect of an increase in analyst coverage. As discussed in
the previous section, we analyze the more ambiguous case, which is also supported by the empirical
evidence, in which analyst coverage crowds out voluntary disclosure. This eect can be decomposed
into two parts:
• A change in the probability that the signal s is made public, either by the manager and/or by
the analyst. The probability of this event is given by
q · gI (r) + q (1− gI (r)) (1− F (σ∗)) + (1− q) gU (r) .
When the manager's equilibrium disclosure threshold, σ∗, is increasing in analyst coverage r, it
is not clear whether this probability increases or decreases following an increase in r.
• Market uncertainty regarding s in case it does not become public. An increase in r aects the
distribution of types given no disclosure, and hence the uncertainty given no disclosure.
Any measure of information must take into account both parts (and thus, for example, the probability
of disclosure does not capture the quality of overall information available to the market). In the next
9Formally, in our setup a public information structure, or experiment, can be dened as a function ψ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
where ψ(s) is the probability that a signal s is disclosed publicly, while with probability 1−ψ(s) the signal is not disclosed
by the analyst or the rm (ND). Now consider two levels of analyst coverage, r and r′, where r′ > r, and the respective
public information structures, ψ and ψ′. In the case of a crowding-in eect (m′(r) < 0 in Proposition 1), ψ′(s) > ψ(s)
for any s. Thus, ψ can be represented as a garbling of ψ′ using a garbling function λ: for any s, there exists λ(s) ∈ (0, 1)
such that ψ(s) = λ(s)ψ′(s). The result that ψ′ is more Blackwell-informative than ψ follows immediately from this
representation and Blackwell's informativeness theorem (Blackwell, 1953).
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section we suggest a measure of price eciency, which is the inverse of the expected squared distance of
prices from the fundamental value. We then show that an increase in analyst coverage always increases
price eciency according to this measure.
4.1. A Measure of Price Eciency
In our model, when information is made public either by the manager or by the analyst, the price
perfectly reects all the information, i.e., the price is PD = E [x̃|s] = s. When information is not made
public the price is on average correct, but it is a noisy measure of the signal (that the manager may
either not know or actively withholding), PND = E [s | ND].
To measure how eciently prices reect information about future cash ows, we adopt the com-
monly used expected squared deviation between the market price and the signal s. Our price eciency






PEF may represent the social benet from having a price that is close to the fundamental, or the
externalities and gains that are obtained from the informativeness of prices. Note that this measure is
in line with our assumption of risk neutral pricing: a social planner who wishes to maximize eciency
will choose P = E [s̃ | I], where I is all the available information.
Another interpretation of PEF is that it is the variance of the noise in the price relative to the true
underlying value s. Thus, higher price eciency means a decrease in the residual uncertainty of prices
(the future movement of prices when the real cash ows x will be realized or revealed).
4.2. Analyst Coverage and Price Eciency
We have discussed above the challenge in determining even the directional eect of changes in
analyst coverage, r, on price eciency. One of our main results is that an increase in analyst coverage
always increases price eciency.




The formal proof of the Proposition is quite involved, and hence is relegated to the appendix.
The economic intuition relies on the qualitative dierence between the two information sources: the
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analyst and the rm. First, following an increase in coverage, the analyst discloses the rm's value
with higher probability. Second, as we pointed out before, under the assumption that m′(r) > 0, an
increase in coverage leads to less corporate disclosure: managers disclose only if the value is above
a higher threshold. We show in the proof that the change in corporate disclosure always has only a
second-order eect on public information compared to the increase in analyst disclosure.
The intuition is as follows. The change in corporate disclosure aects only types that disclose
under low coverage and withhold under a higher coverage. Because the aected types are close to
the disclosure threshold, which equals the price following no disclosure (PND), their pricing after they
cease to be disclosed by the rm is close to the pricing they obtain following disclosure. Thus, the
mispricing that arises because those types cease to be disclosed by the manager is minimal (second
order).
The results of Proposition 2 are supported by Ellul and Panayides (2018), who measure price
eciency using the methodology of Hasbrouck (1993). This methodology uses VAR to statistically es-
timate the dierence between trading prices and the stock's estimated fundamental price, and measure
price ineciency as the standard deviation of this dierence. Our measure of PEF is evidently the
same, though it is developed within a much simpler, static, model. Ellul and Panayides (2018) nd
that price eciency decreases following the termination of analyst coverage, and that the decrease is
more moderate for rms that increased the number of news releases in the post-termination period,
and for rms that issue earning guidance. These results are in line with the predictions of this section.
5. Informed Trading and Liquidity
The results in the previous section examine the eect of analyst coverage on a theoretical measure of
price eciency. While price eciency is a very appealing theoretical construct, empirically measuring
or estimating it is not easy. In this section, we study the eect of analyst coverage on liquidity,
which is a measure of information asymmetry that is common in the empirical literature and can be
measured directly. Our measure of liquidity is the bid-ask spread, which is relatively easy to estimate.
We analyze how the expected bid-ask spread, which reects the information asymmetry that remains
after the disclosure game, is aected by analyst coverage. Note that the bid-ask spread in our model
reects dierence in information quality among market participants, while the price eciency measure
analyzed in the previous section reects the uncertainty of the market overall about the fundamentals.
Although these two measures are related, the two constructs capture dierent aspects of the information
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environment.
We extend our disclosure model by adding a stylized trading stage. Trading occurs after the
manager's potential voluntary disclosure decision and after the potential release of the analyst's report.
Let I be the public information by the end of the disclosure stage, then µ ≡ Pr (x = 1 | I) is the public
belief about the rm's terminal value at the beginning of the trading stage.
The trading stage is a static version of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model (henceforth GM).
The trading stage involves a competitive market maker and a single trader. The trader can either buy
or sell one unit (share) of the rm's stock. With probability 1−p the trader is a  liquidity trader , who
sells or buys independently of the rm's value (for example, due to a liquidity shock). The liquidity
trader chooses to sell or to buy one unit with equal probabilities (our results are robust to changes
in the probabilities). With probability p ∈ (0, 1) the trader is strategic and trades to maximize his
trading prot given his information (we assume this trader obtains a payo of zero in case he does not
trade). With an exogenous probability χ ∈ (0, 1] the strategic trader is informed, and knows the rm's
terminal value, x. Thus, the trader is strategic and informed with probability pχ, and with probability
p(1− χ) the trader is strategic but does not have additional information.
The risk neutral market maker does not have private information about the rm value or the type
of the trader. The market maker operates in a competitive market (which is not modeled), and sets
prices that lead to zero expected prot. Given the initial belief µ, the bid price, b(µ), is set to equal
the expected value of the asset conditional on the trader selling a share. Similarly, the ask price, a(µ),
is set to equal the expected value of the asset conditional on the trader buying a share. The bid-ask
spread, denoted by Ψ(µ), is the dierence between the ask and the bid prices above, that is,
Ψ(µ) ≡ a(µ)− b(µ). (6)
We now provide several technical facts about the extended game. For brevity, we describe them
informally; the formal treatment and proofs appear in Appendix Appendix A.3. As is standard in
GM, the strategic trader buys if x = 1 and sells if x = 0. Thus, a purchase by the trader is a positive
signal about the value of the asset, and a sale by the trader is a negative signal about this value. As a
result, b(µ) < µ < a(µ) for any µ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (0, 1), and the spread is always positive. The spread
is larger when there is higher uncertainty about the value of x, which happens in intermediate levels
of µ; when µ = 0 or µ = 1 the value is known before trading and the spread is zero. An important
property, which is used in our proofs, is that the spread is not only non-monotone, but is also concave
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(that is, inverse U-shaped).
In the Appendix we also analyze the manager's disclosure decision in the extended model. We
show that the disclosure policy is as in the basic model, that is, according to the threshold σ∗ that is
dened in Fact 1. The proof relies on the fact that the ex-ante price is equal to µ, and thus that an
informed manager of type σ∗ expects a price of σ∗.
5.1. Disclosure and Liquidity
The initial public belief µ in the trading stage is a result of the information that is disclosed or not
disclosed by the manager and the analyst at the disclosure stage. In this section we study how the
parameters of the disclosure game aect the liquidity in the trading stage.
Our measure of illiquidity, IL (q, r) > 0, which depends on the parameters of the disclosure game,
q and r (as well as the parameters of the trading stage, p and χ, which are treated as given), is the
expected bid-ask spread, and is given by
IL (q, r) ≡ E [Ψ(µ) | q, r] .
When we refer to liquidity we refer to IL (q, r)
−1
.
We are interested in the eect of analyst coverage, r, on liquidity. The diculty in the analysis
is similar to the one described in Section 4, and stems from the fact that an increase in r has an
ambiguous eect on the probability that the signal becomes public, as well as the eect of the underlying
uncertainty following no disclosure. IL, however, captures a dierent economic construct than PEF. In
particular, expected liquidity is not a linear function of PEF, and hence Proposition 2 does not imply
that the expected liquidity increases in r. For example, if a certain signal s is disclosed with higher
probability following an increase in r, then this clearly has a positive eect on price eciency because
disclosure results in P = s. However, since, as we have explained above, the spread is non-monotone
(see also Lemma 3 in the Appendix), disclosure of s may actually decrease liquidity if Ψ(σ∗) < Ψ(s).
Thus, the direct eect of an increase in coverage on IL is more nuanced than the eect on PEF.
Nevertheless, it is possible to show that analyst coverage always has a total positive eect on liquidity:





The proof of proposition 3 is in the Appendix. The proof uses similar intuition as in the proof of
Proposition 2 to show that the change in disclosure threshold plays a second order eect where the
direct eect is of rst order. This is again because the change in the disclosure threshold aects mostly
rms that are close to the threshold and therefore are priced relatively accurately even when their
manager chooses not to disclose.
The result of Proposition 3, which provides additional motivation for the informational benet
of analyst coverage, is consistent with the empirical ndings of the papers we have presented in the
introduction. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) and Ellul and Panayides (2018) nd that following an
exogenous negative shock to analyst coverage, there is a decrease in the liquidity of the aected rms.
Balakrishnan et al. (2014) as well as Ellul and Panayides (2018) nd evidence that the decrease in
liquidity is partially reversed by an increase in voluntary disclosure (in form of earning guidance and
press releases), but overall liquidity still decreases, in line with the results of this section.
6. Extensions
In this section we discuss two extensions of the model. First, we analyze a model where the manager
may suer a cost if the analyst publishes a report following no disclosure. Next, we discuss how changes
in the information structure may aect our main results.
6.1. Disciplinary Role of Analyst Coverage
In our main model, if the analyst publishes a report, the manager's payo is the same regardless
of whether she has disclosed or not. It seems natural to believe that, conditional on the signal being
revealed anyway, the manager would prefer to disclose that information by herself. If the analyst issues
a report and the rm does not disclose, the rm could be accused of violating its duty to disclose by
hiding unfavorable information. Such an event could trigger costly litigation, and such a possibility
incentivizes the manager to precautionarily disclose information.10 This precautionary motive depends
on the probability that an analyst report will be published, and thus on analyst coverage. In what
follows we introduce precautionary disclosure into our main model.
10See Marinovic and Varas (2016) and Dye (2017) for an additional discussion on litigation risk due to nondisclosure.
Marinovic and Varas (2016) study such litigation risk in a dynamic costly disclosure setup, which is very dierent from
ours. Dye (2017) also extends Dye (1985) by incorporating litigation risk. Both papers dier in the nature and hence
the consequences of the cost: specically, in Dye (2017) the specic litigation cost does not aect the equilibrium.
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6.1.1. A Model with Litigation Costs
We extend the model in Section 2 to include a cost that the manager bears if an analyst report is
published following no corporate disclosure. We refer to this event as analyst only and denote it by
AO, and we refer to the cost as the litigation cost, although it may also represent other costs, such
as reputation cost, etc. To capture the idea that the manager is penalized for actively withholding
information, we let this cost increase with the probability that the manager has private information





is the posterior belief of the market that the manager is informed following an only report event, and
we assume that C(0) = 0 and C ′ > 0.11
When an informed manager who has observed a signal s makes a disclosure decision, she compares
her payo from disclosure, PD (s) = s, to her expected payo from no disclosure, which is now







Note that the payo from no disclosure is less sensitive to s compared to the payo from disclosure.
Thus, as in the basic model, the manager discloses if and only if s is greater than a disclosure threshold,
which we denote by σ∗C . For a given cost function C, σ
∗










where PND(σ) is dened as in (1) and
qAO(σ) ≡ qF (σ) gI
(1− q)gU + qF (σ) gI
. (8)
The following lemma presents the main properties of the equilibrium.
Lemma 2. The game with litigation costs admits a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium the manager
discloses i s > σ∗C , where σ
∗
C is dened as in (7). The equilibrium has the following properties:
1. Litigation costs together with analyst coverage induce precautionary disclosure: if gI > 0, then
σ∗C < σ
∗.
11We continue to assume, as in Section 2, that an informed manager does not know whether the analyst is informed
or not. In the basic model this assumption is not restrictive (Remark 2), but here it is: if an informed manager knows
that the analyst is informed (for example, because the analyst reports before the manager's disclosure decision) then she
can simply disclose in this case and never pay the cost. Such a setting is equivalent to our main model.
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2. Litigation costs cannot induce full disclosure: if gI < 1, then σ
∗
C > 0 for any cost function C.
Part 1 of the lemma asserts that, as expected, in a model with analyst coverage, litigation costs have
a disciplinary role and lead to more corporate disclosure compared to the case where such costs are
not present. The increased disclosure over the interval s ∈ [σ∗C , σ∗] is due to precautionary motive.
Higher costs lead to greater precautionary disclosure. This comparative static predicts that large
rms, which may be more exposed to litigation risks, would, all else equal, voluntarily disclose more
information compared to smaller rms.
Part 2 of the lemma asserts, maybe more surprisingly, that such costs, no matter how high, cannot
prevent the manager from withholding some bad news. The reason is that litigation costs decrease as
disclosure increases, because greater disclosure means that the manager is less likely to be informed
given an only report event. This is formalized by the fact that qAO(σ) is increasing in σ (Equation
(8)). The posterior qAO(σ), and thus the litigation cost, approaches zero as σ approaches zero, and
thus the lowest type always has an incentive to withhold news.
6.1.2. Analyst Coverage and Precautionary Disclosure
In this section we discuss how analyst coverage aects precautionary disclosure. We ask whether
the term σ∗ − σ∗C increases or decreases in r. This complements the analysis in Section 3.2 on the
eect of r on σ∗, that is, disclosure due to price maximization.








(see Equation (7)); the greater this term is for any given σ, the greater the dierence σ∗ − σ∗C is.
An increase in r has two eects on the incentive to precautionary disclosure. First, more coverage
increases the probability that the analyst publishes a report and, therefore, also the risk that an
informed manager will bear a litigation cost if she does not disclose. This increased risk is represented
by the term gI1−gI , which is increasing in gI and, therefore, also in r.
Second, more coverage aects the size of the litigation cost through a change in qAO, the belief that
the manager is informed following no disclosure by the manager and a report by the analyst. This
second eect is ambiguous, because qAO may be increasing or decreasing in r. From (8) it can be easily
seen that ∂q
AO





> 0. Note that this condition is dierent from the condition





> 0. The intuition, however, is similar to the intuition
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behind Proposition 1: if the analyst is relatively more likely to uncover information that is already
available to the manager, then an analyst report is a stronger signal that the manager is withholding
unfavorable information.
The overall eect of analyst coverage on precautionary disclosure therefore depends on qAO(r) and





< 0 and dCdqAO is suciently high, then an increase in r may even
decrease the incentive for precautionary disclosure (the term in (9)). In other examples, an increase
in analyst coverage will increase precautionary disclosure. In Example 2 of Section 3.2, the term gIgU is
constant, and thus qAO is independent of r. Therefore, only the rst eect is present (i.e., the incentive
for precautionary disclosure, (9), increases in r due to an increase in gI), and σ
∗ − σ∗C is increasing in
r. Even in this simple example, the eect of r on the total disclosure threshold, σ∗C , is ambiguous, as
it depends also on the change in σ∗.
6.2. Analyst Observes a Noisier Signal
So far we have assumed that the analyst and the rm manager have a potential to learn the
same information. A natural extension is the case in which the analyst's information is less precise
than the manager's information. Formally, assume a model similar to the one presented in Section 2,
where the information endowment of the analyst and the manager is uncertain and possibly correlated,
except that now the analyst only observe a noisy signal of s, which we denote by sa. Following an
analyst report that is not accompanied by a manager's disclosure, in contrast to the basic setup, some
uncertainty about s remains. This uncertainty is captured by a posterior f (s | sa).
Note rst that in this model, in contrast to the basic model (see Remark 2), the order of moves
matters. If the manager discloses before the analyst and does not know the analyst's signal sa, then
she is uncertain regarding her payo in case she does not disclose. Because the manager's expectations
about this payo depend on her private information, the analysis is convoluted and the model becomes
intractable. Hence, we focus here on the case in which the manager discloses after the analyst. In
such a case, a threshold equilibrium exists and it is unique. In this equilibrium, the manager discloses
according to a threshold that depends on the analyst's report, σ∗(sa), and discloses following no report
using a threshold σ∗(∅). For brevity, we shall not provide a formal characterization of the model and
instead discuss some of its properties.
First, because there are multiple thresholds, it is more dicult to measure how much information is
disclosed by the manager, and the eect of a change in analyst coverage cannot necessarily be described
as crowding out or crowding in. To see why, note that in this model an analyst's report informs
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the market not only of the fundamental value of the rm s, but also of the information endowment
of the manager. An increase in coverage (and thus in the probabilities gI and gU ) may decrease the
probability that the manager is informed given that no analyst report is published, thus increasing
σ∗(∅), and at the same time increase the probability that the manager is informed given an analyst
report, thus decreasing σ∗(sa) for any sa.12
Second, our results regarding the eect of analyst coverage on market quality continue to hold
given additional assumptions on the analyst's information production technology (that is, gI , gU , and
sa). As in the basic model, the direct eect of an increase in analyst coverage on market quality
continues to be of rst order compared to the eect of the change in corporate disclosure. This can
be proven using a similar, albeit more complex, analysis as in Sections 4 and 5. Our results continue
to hold as long as we make additional assumptions to assure that public information is suciently
better following an analyst report compared to no report. Appendix Appendix A.6 provides a more
formal treatment of price eciency in a model with a noisy analyst signal. Though a full analysis is
complex, we show that in the simple case of gU = gI , that is, when the information endowment of the
manager and the analyst are uncorrelated, price eciency never deteriorates when coverage increases,
and strictly increases in a normal distribution example. Though a similar analysis regarding liquidity
is more complex, we believe similar results can be obtained.
7. Concluding Remarks
The vast theoretical literature on voluntary disclosure has focused on settings with a single in-
formation provider. In practice, however, the corporate disclosure environment is complex and often
characterized by several agents who may obtain private information. Financial analysts are one exam-
ple of such agents. In this paper we have studied how the possibility that the rm's private information
may be revealed by a third party (such as an analyst, the media, a regulator, social media, competitors,
suppliers and rating agencies) aects the rm's voluntary disclosure policy and the overall informa-
tion available to the market. Our model demonstrates that an increase in analyst coverage can either
crowd out or crowd in corporate voluntary disclosure  depending on the information structure. The
empirical literature is consistent with a crowding-out eect.
12In this model the quality of outside information depends on the probabilities gI and gU that the analyst observes
sa, as well as on the precision of sa, captured by f (s | sa). For comparability with the basic setup, we treat f (s | sa)
as given, and assume that changes in coverage aect only gI and gU .
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When analyst coverage crowds out corporate voluntary disclosure, the eect of an increase in analyst
coverage on the quality of overall information is a result of two opposing eects  analyst reveal more
information where the rm discloses less information. In order to study the eect of analyst coverage
on the quality of information available to the market, we use two common measures of market quality.
The rst measure is the variance of investors' beliefs (or the future volatility of prices), which has
a natural interpretation of price eciency in our model as it reects the extent to which current
prices reect the fundamentals. The second measure is the expected bid-ask spread, which measures
illiquidity that arises from information asymmetry. In order to calculate the liquidity measure, we
introduce a trading stage à la Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that follows the disclosure game. Our
model shows that an increase in analyst coverage increases market eciency and liquidity even when
analyst coverage crowds out voluntary disclosure. The relative importance of corporate versus third
party disclosure aects the balance between negative and positive information that is revealed to the
market, which in turn determines the quality of public information and other properties such as the
skewness of returns. We have demonstrated the robustness of the results to settings in which the
manager may incur additional costs if she does not disclose but the analyst issues a report, and to
settings in which the analyst's information is less precise than the manager's information.
Our results provide potential regulatory implication, by implying that if the regulator can increase
the probability of discovery of a rm's information by various third-party mechanisms, such as analyst
coverage, it always has a positive eect on the information environment. Therefore, as long as actions
that facilitate more discovery of rm's private information by a third party are not too costly, they
are desired.
Appendix A. Appendix
Appendix A.1. The Minimum Principle Property
An useful property of voluntary disclosure games that also holds in our model is the Minimum
Principle property, rst described by Acharya et al. (2011). We refer to this property below and thus
provided it here. The minimum principle states that the price following no-disclosure, PND(σ), obtains
a global minimum at the equilibrium threshold.
Fact 3 (The Minimum Principle, Acharya et al. 2011, Proposition 1). The equilibrium threshold σ∗ is
the unique disclosure threshold that minimizes the price given no disclosure, that is, σ∗ = minσ P
ND(σ).
27
Appendix A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Denote by PND(σ, r) the price given no disclosure by the rm or the analyst, as a function
of a given disclosure threshold, σ, and a given analyst coverage r. PND(σ, r) is given by (1). In
addition, dene G (r, σ) as the PEF function (Equation (5)) for a given disclosure threshold σ and
analyst coverage r:
G (r, σ) =− E
[
(s− P (σ, r))2
]
=− (1− q) (1− gU (r))E
[(
s− PND (σ, r)
)2]
− q (1− gI(r))F (σ)E
[(
s− PND (σ, r)
)2 | s ≤ σ] .
Note that in equilibrium the manager's disclosure threshold is σ = σ∗(r) and hence, PEF(r) =
G (r, σ∗(r)).
















A sucient condition for ∂PEF∂r > 0 is that (1)
∂G
∂r |σ=σ∗(r)> 0 and (2)
∂G
∂σ |σ=σ∗(r)= 0. We prove those
two properties below.
1. Proof that ∂G∂r |σ=σ∗(r)> 0:
∂G(r,σ)
∂r is given by
∂G (r, σ)
∂r
= (1− q) g′U (r)E
[(
s− PND (σ, r)
)2]
+ q · g′I(r) · F (σ)E
[(
s− PND (σ, r)
)2 | s ≤ σ]
+ 2 (1− q) (1− gU (r))E
[
s− PND (σ, r)
] ∂PND (σ, r)
∂r
+ 2q (1− gI(r))F (σ)E
[
s− PND (σ, r) | s ≤ σ
] ∂PND (σ, r)
∂r
.
Using (1) one can assure that
(1− q) (1− gU (r))E
[
s− PND (σ, r)
]
+ q (1− gI(r))F (σ)E
[




and thus the last two lines sum to zero. At σ = σ∗(r) we therefore obtain
∂G (r, σ)
∂r




+ q · g′I(r) · F (σ∗(r))E
[
(s− σ∗(r))2 | s ≤ σ∗(r)
]
Since, by denition, g′U (r) ≥ 0 and g′U (r) ≥ 0, with at least one strict inequality, we obtain
∂G(r,σ)
∂r |σ=σ∗(r) > 0.
2. Proof that ∂G∂σ |σ=σ∗(r)= 0:
We can rewrite G (r, σ) as




s− PND (σ, r)
)2
f(s) ds




s− PND (σ, r)
)2
f(s) ds.
Dierentiating with respect to σ we obtain
∂G(r, σ)
∂σ

























− q (1− gI(r))
(
σ − PND (σ, r)
)2
.
To obtain ∂G∂σ |σ=σ∗(r) observe that: (i) by Fact 1, σ
∗(r) = PND (σ∗(r), r) . Thus, the third
term in (A.1) equals zero; and (ii) by the minimum principle (Fact 3), ∂P
ND(σ,r)
∂σ |σ=σ∗(r)= 0.
Therefore, the rst two terms in (A.1) also equal zero. Thus ∂G∂σ |σ=σ∗(r)= 0.
Appendix A.3. Prices and Disclosure in the Extended Model with a Trading Stage
This appendix provides additional technical results for the extended model that is described in
Section 5, which includes a disclosure stage that is followed by a trading stage.
Appendix A.3.1. Prices and the Bid-Ask Spread i
In this section we provide a short derivation of the bid and ask prices and the resulting bid-ask
spread in a standard static GM setting. Readers who are familiar with this derivation can skip directly
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to Lemma 3.
First note that a strategic uninformed trader never trades. Such a trader understands that since
the market maker breaks even, and an informed trader gains an information rent, an uninformed trade
is expected to generate a loss. Moreover, a strategic informed trader always buys if x = 1 and sells
if x = 0. This is because the public belief in the beginning of the trading stage, µ, is between zero
and one, and thus the bid and ask prices are also between zero and one.13 Given that the informed
strategic trader always trades, it is clear that no trade does not convey additional information on the
asset's value. Therefore, the posterior beliefs following no trade is E [x̃ | µ,no trade] = µ.
Let purchase and sale denote the events where the trader purchases or sells one unit, respectively.
For a given public belief µ, the probability of a purchase event is pχµ+ (1− p) 12 . Conditional on a
purchase event, the probability that the trader is informed is Pr (informed | purchase) = pχµ
pχµ+(1−p) 12
.
Thus, the market maker sets an ask price that equals
a(µ) ≡ E [x̃ | µ,purchase] = pχµ
pχµ+ (1− p) 12
· 1 +
(1− p) 12






A similar calculation result in a bid price of
b(µ) ≡ E [x̃ | µ, sale] = 1− p
1− p+ 2pχ(1− µ)
µ. (A.3)
It is easy to see that b(µ) < µ < a(µ) for any µ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (0, 1), and that both a(µ) and b(µ) are
strictly increasing in µ. We can use (A.2) and (A.3) to calculate the bid-ask spread Ψ(µ) ≡ a(µ)−b(µ).
The following Lemma provides some properties of the bid-ask spread.
Lemma 3. The bid-ask spread, Ψ(µ), has the following properties:
1. It is a strictly concave inverse U-shape function of µ.
2. Ψ(0) = Ψ(1) = 0.
3. For any µ ∈ (0, 1) ,the spread is increasing in p and χ.
13For simplicity, assume that in the zero probability events that there is no uncertainty about x in the beginning of
the trading stage, that is, s = µ = 1, and s = µ = 0, the informed trader still chooses to buy and sell, respectively, for a
fair price.
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The proof is trivial and merely involves dierentiation of (6) after substituting (A.2) and (A.3), and
thus is omitted. The main characteristic of the bid-ask spread that we will be using is the concavity
in the beliefs, µ.
Appendix A.3.2. Disclosure Decision in the Extended Model
In this section we analyze the manager's disclosure strategy when she knows that a trading stage
occurs following her disclosure decision. The basic model in Section 3 assumes risk neutral pricing
based on all publicly available information, that is, assumes P = µ. In the extended model, however,
there are three possible prices: an ask price a(µ) when the trader buys one unit (a purchase), a bid
price b(µ) when the trader sells one unit (a sale), and µ when there is no trade. From an outsider's
point of view, such as the market maker, the expected price is always µ. This can be easily seen using
the law of iterated expectation:
E [P ;µ] = Pr (purchase;µ) · a(µ) + Pr (sale;µ) · b(µ) + Pr (no trade;µ) · µ
=E [x̃ | µ] = µ.
If an informed manager chooses to disclose her signal s, then this leads to a public belief µ = s.
Following disclosure, because the manager has the same information as the market maker and the
public regarding the value of the rm, the informed manager expected price, or payo, is also UD(s) ≡
E [P ; s] = s. This is not the case, however, if neither the manager nor the analyst disclose. In such
a case an informed manager has a better prediction than the market maker about the information of
the informed trader, and thus about the probabilities of purchase and sale events. A manager with
a better signal s, is more optimistic about the possibility that the trader will purchase and the price
will be a(µ), and gives a lower probability to a price of b(µ). Thus, in contrast to the basic model, the
informed manager's payo conditional on no disclosure is increasing in her type.
Nevertheless, one can show that the extended model has a threshold equilibrium and, moreover,
this threshold is the same as the one in the basic model. The following proposition describes the
equilibrium of the extended two-stage model.
Proposition 4. The unique equilibrium of the extended model has a threshold disclosure strategy, σ∗.
The threshold σ∗ is the unique solution of the indierence condition (2), as in the basic model.
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Proof. Let the public expectation of x̃ given no disclosure be some exogenous belief µ = PND. I prove
the proposition using the following steps:
1. Type s = PND is indierent: A manager that observes a signal s and expect a public belief
of PND, expects a payo of
UND(s, PND) ≡ Pr (purchase; s) · a(PND) + Pr (sale; s) · b(PND) + Pr (no trade; s) · µ. (A.4)
Due to the law of iterated expectations, UND(s, s) = s = UD(s), so an informed manager with a
signal s = PND is indierent whether to disclose or not.
2. Equilibrium involves a threshold strategy: From the analysis in Section Appendix A.3.1
we know that a manager with a signal s expects the following probabilities of events:
Pr (purchase; s) = pχs+
1− p
2
Pr (sale; s) = pχ(1− s) + 1− p
2
Pr (no trade) = p(1− χ)












is dened using (6). Because, by denition, Ψ ≤ 1, then ∂U
ND(s,·)
∂s ∈ (0, 1) for
any s. Thus, given step 1, UND(s, PND) Q UD(s) = s if and only if s R PND. That is, there is a
threshold equilibrium. Moreover, let σ∗ denote the equilibrium threshold, then σ∗ = PND.
3. Threshold calculated using the same condition as in the basic model: Finally, given
that there is a threshold equilibrium, in equilibrium the belief following no disclosure by the
manager or the analyst satises (1), and given step 2 the threshold type is a solution to the xed
point condition (2). This is the same condition as in the basic model and therefore the threshold
is the same.
Proposition 4 entails that the threshold is independent of χ, the probability that the trader is
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informed, and is the same as the threshold in a disclosure game where prices simply equal to the
expected fundamental. Therefore, all the results of Section 3, including Proposition 1 about the eect
of changes in analyst coverage, hold in this model as well. The proof is in the Appendix, but to see
the intuition behind the result recall that in the basic model the public belief following no disclosure
is µ = σ∗ = PND(σ∗) (Fact 1). To see that σ∗ is the threshold also in the extended model note that
type σ∗ has the same beliefs as the market following disclosure as well as no-disclosure. Thus, for the
same argument as in the previous paragraph, this type expects an average price of µ = σ∗ following
disclosure as well as following no-disclosure.
Appendix A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. For a given and constant value of q, dene a function H (r, σ) that equals the expected spread
conditional on analyst coverage r and a given disclosure threshold σ (which may not be the equilibrium
threshold), as follows:




+ ((1− q)gU (r) + q · gI(r)) · E [Ψ(s)] (A.5)
+ q · (1− gI(r))
∫ 1
σ
Ψ(s) · f(s) ds,
where
Pr ND (r, σ) ≡ (1− q) (1− gU (r)) + q (1− gI(r))F (σ) (A.6)
is the probability of no disclosure, andPND(σ, r), given in (1), is the price following no-disclosure by
the manager or the analyst. When evaluated at the equilibrium disclosure threshold, H (σ, r) is our














To obtain dIL(q,r)dr < 0 it is sucient to show that
∂H(σ,r)
∂r |σ=σ∗(r)< 0 and
∂H(σ,r)
∂σ |σ=σ∗(r)= 0. We




Proof. We show that ∂H(σ,r)∂r < 0 for any given σ, and hence it also holds for σ = σ
∗(r). Given the
continuity of H(r, σ) in r, it is sucient to show that H(rh, σ) < H(rl, σ) for any rh > rl and any σ.
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1. Using (A.10), we compute H(rl, σ)−H(rh, σ):








+ [(1− q) (gU (rl)− gU (rh)) + q · (gI(rl)− gI(rh))] · E [Ψ(s)]
+ q · (gI(rh)− gI(rl))
∫ 1
σ
Ψ(s) · f(s) ds








− (1− q) (gU (rh)− gU (rl)) · E [Ψ(s)]
− q · (gI(rh)− gI(rl))F (σ) · E [Ψ(s) | s < σ]
We can therefore establish that H(rl, σ)−H(rh, σ) > 0 if and only if








+ (1− q) (gU (rh)− gU (rl)) · E [Ψ(s)]
+ q · (gI(rh)− gI(rl))F (σ) · E [Ψ(s) | s < σ] . (A.8)
2. Now observe from (1) that
Pr ND (r, σ) · PND(σ, r) = (1− q) (1− gU (r))E [s] + qF (σ) (1− gI(r)) · E [s | s < σ] .
This equation, applied to rl and rh, together with some some algebra, leads to
Pr ND (rl, σ) · PND(σ, rl) = Pr ND (rh, σ) · PND(σ, rh)
+ (1− q) (gU (rh)− gU (rl))E [s]
+ q (gI(rh)− gI(rl))F (σ) · E [s | s < σ] . (A.9)
Observe the similarity between the LHS and RHS of (A.8) and (A.9); in the next step we use
(A.9) to prove that (A.8).
3. We can use (A.6) to rewrite (A.9) explicitly as
PND(σ, rl) = A · PND(σ, rh) +B · E [s] + (1−A−B) · E [s | s < σ]
34
where A = PrND(rh,σ)PrND(rl,σ) and B =
(1−q)[(gU (rh)−gU (rl))]
PrND(rl,σ)
. This representation presents PND(σ, rl) as
an average of PND(σ, rh) and various signals. In order to obtain (A.8) remember that Ψ(·), is a









+B · E [Ψ (s)] + (1−A−B) · E [Ψ (s) | s < σ] .
This inequality is simply (A.8), and thus implies that H(rl, σ) > H(rh, σ).
Lemma 5. ∂H∂σ |σ=σ∗(r)= 0.
Proof. Dierentiating (A.5) with respect to σ we obtain
∂H
∂σ












To obtain ∂H∂σ |σ=σ∗(r) observe that: (i) by Fact 1, σ
∗(r) = PND (σ∗(r), r) . Thus, the rst term in
(A.10) equals zero; and (ii) by the minimum principle (Fact 3), ∂P
ND(σ,r)
∂σ |σ=σ∗(r)= 0. Therefore, the
second term in (A.10) also equals zero. Thus ∂H∂σ |σ=σ∗(r)= 0.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Appendix A.5. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The paragraph before the lemma explains why any equilibrium must have a threshold strategy.




where qAO(σ) is dened in (8). It is easy
to observe from (8) that qAO(σ) = 0 and ∂q
AO
∂σ > 0. Given that C(0) = 0 and C
′ > 0, then C̃(0) = 0
and C̃ ′ > 0.
For a given disclosure threshold σ, dene
J(σ) ≡ PND(σ)− gI
1− gI
C̃(σ),
where PND(σ) is dened in (1). By Equation (7), the equilibrium threshold σ∗C is dened using the
equality σ∗C = J (σ
∗
C). To see that such a threshold exists rst observe from (1) that P
ND(0) =
PND(1) = E[s]. Thus, J(0) = E [s] > 0 and J(1) < PND(1) = E [s] < 1. By continuity, σ∗C exists>
Moreover, it is strictly greater than zero, which is Part 2 of the lemma.
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Part 1 of the lemma is immediate by the fact that, if gI > 0, then J(σ) < P
ND(σ), and thus
σ∗C < σ
∗, where σ∗ is dened in Fact 1.
By the minimum principle (Fact 3), the function PND(σ) is decreasing for values σ < σ∗. Because
C̃ ′ > 0, J(σ) is also decreasing for σ < σ∗. This assures the uniqueness of the threshold.
Appendix A.6. Price Eciency in a Model with Noisy Analyst's Signal
Consider the model described in Section 6.2, in which the analyst's information is less precise than
the manager's information. Specically, assume that the analyst may observe a noisy signal sa about s,
and that sa, if observed, is published before an informed manager decides whether to disclose s or not.
In what follows, we treat the probability that the manager is informed q, as well as the distributions
of s and sa as given and xed, and consider only a change in the conditional probabilities that the
analyst is informed, gI and gU .
General analysis of price eciency.. The purpose of this section is to analyze how price eciency,
as dened in Equation (5), behaves in this model. First, consider a game in which gU = gI = 0,
that is, there is no analyst. This game is the model of Dye (1985). For a given probability that the
manager is informed q, Let PEF0(q) be the price eciency in this game. Now consider the game
in which gU = gI = 1, that is, s
a is always publicly available. Following a given realization of sa,
the game is similar to the model by Dye (1985) with a posterior probability f (s | sa). The manager,
if informed, decides whether to disclose using a threshold strategy σ∗(sa). Let PEF1(q) be the ex-
ante price eciency in this game, that is, PEF1(q) is a weighted average of price eciencies that are
calculated for any given signal sa.
In a model with general gU and gI , denote by Pr s
a ≡ q · gI + (1− q)gU the overall probability that
the analyst observes sa and publishes a report, and by
q̂1 =
q · gI




(1− q)(1− gU ) + q(1− gI)
the probabilities that the manager is informed conditional on an analyst report, and conditional on no
analyst report, respectively. Price eciency equals to
PEF(q, gI , gU ) = (1− Pr sa) PEF0 (q̂0) + Pr sa · PEF1 (q̂1) . (A.11)
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This is simply a result of the law of iterated expectation.
Using (A.11) we can analyze how price eciency is aected by a small increase in coverage, that
is, an increase in gI and/or gU (remember we assume that g
′
U (r) ≥ 0 and g′I (r) ≥ 0). The eect of an
increase in coverage can be decomposed into two parts:
1. A direct change: an increase in the probability of an analyst report Pr sa, that increases the
relative weight of PEF1 (q̂1) and decreases the weight of PEF0 (q̂0).
2. An indirect change: changes in q̂1 and q̂0 that aect the manager's disclosure strategy and change
PEF1 (q̂1) and PEF0 (q̂0), respectively.
Uncorrelated information endowment (gU = gI). If gI(r) = gU (r) = g(r), then q̂0 = q̂1 = q and
Pr sa = g. Thus, a change in r aects price eciency only through a direct change in Pr sa (eect 1
above). Overall price eciency therefore increases if and only if PEF1 (q) > PEF0 (q).
We rst show this is always the case when sa and s follow a joint normal distribution. Without loss
of generality assume that both have zero mean, that is, sa = s+ u where s ∼ N(0, σ2s), , u ∼ N(0, σ2u)





and b = 1 − a < 1. Let z∗ be the
disclosure threshold in a Dye model when the prior is N(0, 1). Proposition 2 in Acharya et al. (2011)
shows that when the prior is distributed N(µ, σ2), the disclosure threshold is µ+σz∗. Thus, for normal
distributions, price eciency (as dened in (5)) satises PEFN(µ,σ2) = σ
2PEFN(0,1). An immediate
implication is that PEF1(q) = b
2PEF0(q) > PEF0(q).
In the general case we can show that PEF1(q) ≥ PEF0(q) using an argument that follows Hart et al.
(2017). We describe the argument informally and point the reader to Hart et al. (2017) for the formal
treatment. Consider the game where the analyst always publish a report, that is, gI = gU = 1, and
suppose that, instead of risk neutral pricing, the market (receiver) can commit at the beginning of
the game on any pricing function. Specically, suppose that the market chooses to ignore the signal sa:
P = s following a disclosure by the manager, and P = E [s | ND] following no such disclosure, where
this price is the same as the price in a game without an analyst. Clearly, following such commitment the
manager will choose the same disclosure strategy as in a game without an analyst, and price eciency
will be PEF0. The main result of Hart et al. (2017) is that such a commitment cannot decrease the
quadratic loss; that is, price eciency without such commitment, PEF1, is equal or greater than PEF0.
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